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The statistical education of scientists emphasizes a flawed
approach to data analysis that should have been discarded
long ago. This defective method is statistical significance
testing. It degrades quantitative findings into a qualitative
decision about the data. Its underlying statistic, the P-value,
conflates two important but distinct aspects of the data, effect
size and precision [1]. It has produced countless misinter-
pretations of data that are often amusing for their folly, but
also hair-raising in view of the serious consequences.
Significance testing maintains its hold through brilliant
marketing tactics—the appeal of having a ‘‘significant’’
result is nearly irresistible—and through a herd mentality.
Novices quickly learn that significant findings are the key
to publication and promotion, and that statistical signifi-
cance is the mantra of many senior scientists who will
judge their efforts. Stang et al. [2], in this issue of the
journal, liken the grip of statistical significance testing on
the biomedical sciences to tyranny, as did Loftus in the
social sciences two decades ago [3]. The tyranny depends
on collaborators to maintain its stranglehold. Some collude
because they do not know better. Others do so because they
lack the backbone to swim against the tide.
Students of significance testing are warned about two
types of errors, type I and II, also known as alpha and beta
errors. A type I error is a false positive, rejecting a null
hypothesis that is correct. A type II error is a false negative,
a failure to reject a null hypothesis that is false. A large
literature, much of it devoted to the topic of multiple
comparisons, subgroup analysis, pre-specification of
hypotheses, and related topics, are aimed at reducing type I
errors [4]. This lopsided emphasis on type I errors comes at
the expense of type II errors. The type I error, the false
positive, is only possible if the null hypothesis is true. If the
null hypothesis is false, a type I error is impossible, but a
type II error, the false negative, can occur.
Type I and type II errors are the product of forcing the
results of a quantitative analysis into the mold of a deci-
sion, which is whether to reject or not to reject the null
hypothesis. Reducing interpretations to a dichotomy,
however, seriously degrades the information. The conse-
quence is often a misinterpretation of study results, stem-
ming from a failure to separate effect size from precision.
Both effect size and precision need to be assessed, but they
need to be assessed separately, rather than blended into the
P-value, which is then degraded into a dichotomous deci-
sion about statistical significance.
As an example of what can happen when significance
testing is exalted beyond reason, consider the case of the
Wall Street Journal investigative reporter who broke the
news of a scandal about a medical device maker, Boston
Scientific, having supposedly distorted study results [5].
Boston Scientific reported to the FDA that a new device
was better than a competing device. They based their
conclusion in part on results from a randomized trial in
which the significance test showing the superiority of their
device had a P-value of 0.049, just under the criterion of
0.05 that the FDA used statistical significance. The reporter
found, however, that the P-value was not significant when
calculated using 16 other test procedures that he tried. The
P-values from those procedures averaged 0.051. According
to the news story, that small difference between the
reported P-value of 0.049 and the journalist’s recalculated
P-value of 0.051 was ‘‘the difference between success and
failure’’ [5]. Regardless of what the ‘‘correct’’ P-value is
for the data in question, it should be obvious that it is
absurd to classify the success or failure of this new device
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according to whether or not the P-value falls barely on one
side or the other of an arbitrary line, especially when the
discussion revolves around the third decimal place of the
P-value. No sensible interpretation of the data from the
study should be affected by the news in this newspaper
report. Unfortunately, the arbitrary standard imposed by
regulatory agencies, which foster that focus on the P-value,
reduces the prospects for more sensible evaluations.
In their article, Stang et al. [2] not only describe the
problems with significance testing, but also allude to the
solution, which is to rely on estimation using confidence
intervals. Sadly, although the use of confidence intervals is
increasing, for many readers and authors they are used only
as surrogate tests of statistical significance [6], to note
whether the null hypothesis value falls inside the interval or
not. This dichotomy is equivalent to the dichotomous
interpretation that results from significance testing. When
confidence intervals are misused in this way, the entire
conclusion can depend on whether the boundary of the
interval is located precisely on one side or the other of an
artificial criterion point. This is just the kind of mistake that
tripped up the Wall Street Journal reporter. Using a con-
fidence interval as a significance test is an opportunity lost.
How should a confidence interval be interpreted? It
should be approached in the spirit of a quantitative esti-
mate. A confidence interval allows a measurement of both
effect size and precision, the two aspects of study data that
are conflated in a P-value. A properly interpreted confi-
dence interval allows these two aspects of the results to be
inferred separately and quantitatively. The effect size is
measured directly by the point estimate, which, if not given
explicitly, can be calculated from the two confidence lim-
its. For a difference measure, the point estimate is the
arithmetic mean of the two limits, and for a ratio measure,
it is the geometric mean. Precision is measured by the
narrowness of the confidence interval. Thus, the two limits
of a confidence interval convey information on both effect
size and precision. The single number that is the P-value,
even without degrading it into categories of ‘‘significant’’
and ‘‘not significant’’, cannot measure two distinct things.
Instead the P-value mixes effect size and precision in a way
that by itself reveals little about either.
Scientists who wish to avoid type I or type II errors at all
costs may have chosen the wrong profession, because
making and correcting mistakes are inherent to science.
There is a way, however, to minimize both type I and type
II errors. All that is needed is simply to abandon signifi-
cance testing. If one does not impose an artificial and
potentially misleading dichotomous interpretation upon the
data, one can reduce all type I and type II errors to zero.
Instead of significance testing, one can rely on confidence
intervals, interpreted quantitatively, not simply as surrogate
significance tests. Only then would the analyses be truly
quantitative.
Finally, here is a gratuitous bit of advice for testers and
estimators alike: both P-values and confidence intervals are
calculated and all too often interpreted as if the study they
came from were free of bias. In reality, every study is
biased to some extent. Even those who wisely eschew
significance testing should keep in mind that if any study
were increased in size, its precision would improve and
thus all its confidence intervals would shrink, but as they
do, they would eventually converge around incorrect val-
ues as a result of bias. The final interpretation should
measure effect size and precision separately, while con-
sidering bias and even correcting for it [7].
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